'박근혜 지지율'에 해당되는 글 1건

¶2. (C) Roh apparently takes some comfort in comparing

himself to figures from the past, especially President

Truman, who have been judged with more kindness by historians

than contemporaries. He tells his staff that his North Korea

policy was fundamentally sound and that it opened a new era

of inter-Korean dialogue, a prerequisite for reconciling with

the North. He also takes considerable pride in having

reduced regionalism, the malignant rivalry between the

Southeast and the Southwest, which has traditionally infected

all aspects of Korean politics and society. Also of comfort

to Roh is that he is likely to be the first president in

decades without himself or his sons facing jail for

corruption, and he deserves credit for dramatically reducing

corruption in election finance. Many of these developments

are of course due to the maturing of South Korean politics,

but it is also true that Roh's tenure has shown that there is

a place in South Korea for center-left government that

emphasizes fairness, equality and, above all, mass

participation in government and politics. While the policies

and ideas he advocated will remain, Roh is likely to

disappear from the political scene for now. END SUMMARY.

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REASONS TO BE DSAPPOINTED
--------------------------

¶3. (C) Roh has been remarkably quiet since the crushing

defeat of his candidate, Chung Dong-young, in the December 19

presidential election. Chung won just 26.3 percent of the

vote compared to 48.7 percent for Lee Myung-bak, the

conservative candidate. More telling, candidates opposed to

Roh -- Lee Myung-bak and Lee Hoi-chang -- won 63.8 percent,

compared to 36.2 percent for progressive and left-wing

candidates. According to a senior Blue House official, Roh

expected a defeat, but not by such an enormous margin. Over

the past two months, Roh has apparently been drinking heavily

with close friends and aides, expressing deep disillusionment

at the turn of events.

¶4. (C) Most hurtful for Roh is the blame for the defeat

heaped on him even by his former supporters. His party

stalwarts are openly lamenting Roh's inept performance,

virtually unanimous in tracing Lee Myung-bak's victory to

Roh's mishandling of state affairs. Centrist party

officials, such as former lawmaker and Roh campaign advisor

Chyung Dai-chul, blame Roh for ignoring party politics,

hiring incompetent staff, and making frequent public speaking

gaffes. Mostly, however, they blame him for implementing

leftist policies, especially toward North Korea and on social

issues such as education and real estate ownership, that are

unacceptable to mainstream South Koreans.

¶5. (C) On the other hand, Roh's leftist supporters note that

Roh turned his back on his core support base when he pushed

through the KORUS FTA and sent troops to Iraq. They were

also deeply disappointed that Roh's rhetoric was far louder

than his action on economic development, especially his

failure to do anything about the ever-increasing gap between

rich and poor. For some time, even the leftists were tired

of Roh's inability to execute "change," criticizing his

policies as too ideological and sentimental, and chiding Roh

himself for being inflexible and stubborn.

¶6. (C) Perhaps the most telling sign of widespread public

discontent can be seen in the youngest group of voters who

were instrumental in voting him in during the chaotic 2002

presidential elections. In a November 2007 survey of Seoul

university students, the younger generation expressed the

greatest displeasure with Roh's handling of state affairs

(only 12.1 percent approved), education policies (14.6

percent), social polarization (16.1 percent), and

labor/employment policies (17.5 percent). Professor Kang

Won-taek of Soongsil University said, "It may be

understandable for a liberal government to increase taxes,

but the problem was that the people couldn't feel the

benefits in return, since the education and housing prices

soared over the past decade." There was no group that stayed

loyal to Roh -- even in the traditionally liberal southwest

Jeolla region, where liberal candidates typically receive

over 90 percent support, Chung Dong-young won only 80

percent.

----------------------
TOO EARLY TO BE ANGRY?
----------------------

¶7. (C) Although numbering only a few, there are still

defenders of Roh Moo-hyun. One of them is Park Sun-won, who

has been a senior Blue House staffer since the beginning of

Roh's term. Granted, Roh has been clumsy and stubborn, Park

said, but Roh will be remembered for reducing the power of

the government, introducing transparency in government, and

providing opportunities to women and other disadvantaged

segments of the population. Even Roh's detractors admit that

under Roh's presidency, there have been significant gains:

-- A reduction in the power and authority of the Prosecutors'

Office, the National Tax Office, and the National

Intelligence Service (NIS). Traditionally, these three

offices have been the tools of choice for the Blue House to

threaten and control its detractors. Victims have ranged

from political opponents to newspapers to big business. The

consensus view is that abusive practices by these three

offices have declined dramatically under Roh.

-- A reduction in corruption. Along with the diminished

roles of the prosecutors, tax officials and NIS, there has

been a reduction in corruption. Roh's presidency has been

largely free of illegal political funds, corruption and

bribery scandals. If Roh is to get into legal trouble, most

pundits speculate, it will be because of suspicions that he

had a role in covering up for illegal fundraising by the

previous president, Kim Dae-jung.

-- A decrease in regionalism. A passionate ideologue, Roh

was elected on a center-left policy platform. Roh's

continued adherence to progressive policies, especially his

founding of the Uri Party, has made South Korean politics

based more on policies than regions. Regionalism is still

alive and well, but its influence is less pervasive. As

noted, Chung Dong-young, for example, received only 80

percent of votes from Jeolla Provinces, compared to 92.9

percent for KDJ in 1997 and 93.2 percent for Roh in 2002.

-- An increase in human rights awareness. Roh's

Administration created the Ministry of Gender Equality, which

was instrumental in passing anti-trafficking and

anti-prostitution laws. Also significant, Roh himself was

very much out in front in advocating measures to correct

societal imbalances resulting from urbanization and

globalization, although he fell short of passing any concrete

legislation.

¶8. (C) On security issues, Roh also chalked up a few gains.

While many criticize his North Korea policy, he achieved a

summit with Kim Jong-il, opened the Kaesong Industrial

Complex, and expanded economic cooperation that even many

critics agree helped ease tensions on the Peninsula. Even on

U.S.-ROK relations, while Roh was much criticized throughout

the election campaign by the conservatives, he was

accommodating in relocating the Second Infantry Division and

USFK headquarters to Pyeongtaek, dispatching troops to Iraq,

and concluding the KORUS FTA negotiations. The U.S. and

Korea also agreed to transfer operational wartime control

(OPCON) to the ROK during Roh's tenure, and were able to

settle longstanding differences over the environmental

standards to be met in the return of military bases and camps.

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COMMENT
-------

¶9. (C) Roh's approach to the presidency was a radical

departure from the political traditions in South Korea

represented by the "Three Kims" (Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam

and Kim Jong-pil). Promising an end to "boss" politics, Roh

made the presidency approachable. On taking office, Roh had

unprecedented public meetings with citizens and even blogged

directly on the Blue House web site, arguing his case ranging

from why Korea needed educational reform to the evils of

Japanese colonial rule. Roh promised that he could

fundamentally renovate Korean politics and selflessly push

forward with far-reaching political reforms. These were

lofty, probably unattainable goals, but made worse by Roh's

personal style, which many Koreans found distasteful. Still,

these remain goals and policies that attract a large

following in Korea. They will now have to find a new

champion and, over time, Koreans may well conclude that Roh

advanced their goal of establishing the center-left as a

force capable of and prepared to hold the reins of

government.

VERSHBOW